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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Kyle Steven Bower appeals from the judgment of conviction for two counts of 
lewd conduct and one count of sexual abuse following a jury trial. On appeal, 
Mr. Bower asserts that the district court committed legal error when it denied his motion 
to sever count two from counts one and three because they were improperly joined. In 
denying the motion, the district court mistakenly considered the motion as one made 
under Idaho Criminal Rule 14, which it is in the district court's discretion to grant or 
deny, rather than Idaho Criminal Rule 8, which involves a legal determination of the 
propriety of joinder. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Kyle Steven Bower was charged, by superseding indictment, with two counts of 
lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen and one count of sexual abuse of a child under 
sixteen. (R., pp.19-21.) The conduct charged in counts one and three was alleged to 
have occurred against K.8. 1 between 2011 and 2012, when she was between the ages 
of 13 and 14 years old; the conduct charged in count two was alleged to have occurred 
against J.B.2 in 2004, when she was between the ages of 10 and 11 years old. 
(R., p.20.) Count one, involving K.B., alleged "manual to genital and/or genital to genital 
contact," while count two, involving J.B. alleged "manual to genital contact." (R., p.20.) 
Count three, involving K.B., alleged "manual to breast contact." (R., p.20.) 
1 K.B. is the biological daughter of Mr. Bower. (Tr., p.277, Ls.3-13.) 
2 J.B. considered Mr. Bower to be her main father figure, as her biological father was 
not involved in her early life, and although they never married, Mr. Bower and her 
mother spent nine years together. (Tr., p.485, L.19- p.487, L.21.) 
1 
Mr. Bower filed a Motion to Sever count two from counts one and three, asserting 
that the facts and circumstances are "separate and apart from each other," the victims 
are different, the incidents were alleged to have occurred years apart, and "[h]aving 
these counts together will highly prejudice" Mr. Bower. (R., p.39.) The district court 
denied the Motion to Sever, concluding that "Defendant has failed to make a prima facie 
showing that any of the factors identified by the Idaho appellate courts as justifying 
severance are present in this case." (R., p.53.) 
Following a jury trial, Mr. Bower was found guilty of all three counts. (Tr., p. 750, 
L.6 - p.751, L.4.) Mr. Bower filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., p.295.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Bower's motion to sever because the 
allegations in count two were not based on the same act or transaction or part of a 
"common scheme or plan" to commit the allegations in counts one and three? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Bower's Motion To Sever Because The 
Conduct Alleged In Count Two Was Not Based On The Same Act Or Transaction Or 
Part Of A "Common Scheme Or Plan" To Commit The Conduct Alleged In Counts One 
And Three 
A Introduction 
In denying Mr. Bower's motion to sever count two - which contained allegations 
concerning a different alleged victim and conduct that purportedly occurred more than 
six years before the allegations in counts one and three - the district court committed 
legal error. The district court's analysis was based on the misunderstanding that the 
motion to sever was one brought under Idaho Criminal Rule 14, rather than a claim that 
the original joinder was improper under Idaho Criminal Rule 8. Regardless of the basis 
for its decision to deny the motion to sever, the district court erred in doing so as the 
conduct alleged in count two was not based on the same act or transaction or part of a 
common scheme or plan to commit the conduct alleged in counts one and three. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Bower's Motion To Sever Because 
The Conduct Alleged In Count Two Was Not Based On The Same Act Or 
Transaction Or Part Of A "Common Scheme Or Plan" To Commit The Conduct 
Alleged In Counts One And Three 
Idaho Criminal Rule 8(a) provides: 
Two (2) or more offenses may be charged on the same complaint, 
indictment or information and a separate count for each offense if the 
offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are based 
on the same act or transaction or on two (2) or more acts or transactions 
connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. 
I.C.R. 8(a) (hereinafter, Rule 8). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained that a claim that charges were 
improperly joined under Rule 8 involves both different considerations and a different 
standard of review than a motion to sever brought pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 14 
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(hereinafter, Rule 14 ). See State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 226 (1985) ("Parties 
properly joined under I.C.R. 8(b) may be severed under !.C.R. 14 if it appears that joint 
trial would be prejudicial, and the defendant has the burden of showing such prejudice.") 
(citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 565-66 
(2007) ("[A]n abuse of discretion standard is applied when reviewing the denial of a 
motion to sever joinder pursuant to !.C.R. 14; however, that rule presumes joinder was 
proper in the first place") (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
The bulk of Mr. Bower's motion to sever was centered on the dissimilarities 
between the conduct alleged in count two versus that alleged in counts one and three. 
Specifically, Mr. Bower noted that "[t]he facts and circumstances surrounding the 
Counts are separate and apart from each other," most notably the incidents, the alleged 
victims, and the dates for the alleged acts, which were "years apart."3 (R., p.39.) 
Mr. Bower's motion to sever constituted a challenge to the propriety of the original 
joinder; therefore, review by this Court is free under Rule 8, rather than for an abuse of 
discretion under Rule 14. Field, 144 Idaho at 565 ("Whether a court improperly joined 
offenses pursuant to !.C.R. 8 is a question of law, over which this Court exercises free 
review.") (citations omitted). In light of the argument set forth infra, Mr. Bower asserts 
that the district court erred when it denied his motion to sever count two from counts 
one and three because the conduct alleged in count two was not based on the same act 
or transaction or part of a "common scheme or plan" to commit the conduct alleged in 
counts one and three.4 
3 One of the four reasons given was not subject to Rule 8 analysis, namely, "Having 
these counts together will highly prejudice defendant." (R., p.39.) 
4 Mr. Bower will focus on the "common scheme or plan" analysis, as it cannot be argued 
that count two involved the same act or transaction as counts one and three. 
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In denying Mr. Bower's motion to sever, the district court appears to have 
misunderstood this Court's interpretation of Rule 14 when considering improperly-joined 
charges or co-defendants, despite the fact that the State cited Field during argument 
(Tr., p.5, Ls.13-20), and that the district court itself mentioned Rule 8 and severance 
when it parenthetically described State v. Longoria, 133 Idaho 819, 824 (Ct. App. 1999). 
(R., p.52.) Ultimately, the district court concluded that its decision was discretionary 
(R., p.51 ), and deciding that severance was not warranted, reasoned, 
The court concludes that Defendant has failed to make a prima facie 
showing that any of the factors identified by the Idaho appellate courts as 
justifying severance are present in this case. There is no indication that 
the jury will confuse and cumulate the evidence relevant to the various 
counts. In fact, it would appear that the difference in the alleged victims 
and the great variance in dates between Count II and Counts I and Ill 
would militate against a finding that the jury would be confused on the 
evidence presented on the different counts in this case. 
(R., p.53 (emphasis added).)5 
In Field, this Court explained, "Cases discussing common plans have focused on 
whether the offenses were one continuing action or whether the offenses have sufficient 
common elements including the type of sexual abuse, the circumstances under which 
the abuse occurred, and the age of the victims." Field, 144 Idaho at 565. The 
defendant in Field was charged with having manual-to-genital contact with a seven year 
5 The district court also concluded, with a single sentence of analysis, "In addition, the 
State made at least a prima facie showing that evidence of Defendant's conduct in 
Count II would be admissible in a trial on Counts I and Ill and vice versa." (R., p.54.) 
One problem with the district court's analysis is that it fell well short of this Court's 
admonition that, when considering Rule 404(b) evidence, "trial courts must carefully 
scrutinize evidence offered as 'corroboration' or as demonstrating a 'common scheme 
or plan' in order to avoid the erroneous introduction of evidence that is merely probative 
of defendant's propensity to engage in criminal behavior." State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 
53 (2009). Furthermore, as this Court has explained, "whether evidence would have 
been admissible absent the joinder is only a factor in determining whether a proper 
joinder is prejudicial and not whether joinder is proper in the first place." Field, 144 
Idaho at 565 n.2 (citation omitted). 
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old girl in 2003, and having rubbed the buttocks of a 17 year old girl in 2001. Id. at 566. 
Before the district court, the argued that joinder was appropriate because "the 
offenses constitute a common scheme because Field asked the individual girls to come 
near him, began to 'innocently' touch them and then put his hand down their pants." Id. 
On appeal, the State added an additional reason that joinder was appropriate: "that 
Field had a plan to take advantage of underage girls that come into his home to babysit 
or be babysat." Id. 
In rejecting the State's argument and finding joinder improper under Rule 8, this 
Court reasoned, "the incidents occurred at different times, under different 
circumstances, and involved different parties with significantly different ages." Id. This 
Court further explained, 'These separate acts did not constitute part of a common 
scheme or plan. There is nothing to show that at the time Field committed the offense 
against T.B. he had a plan to also commit an offense against H.P .... [or] against 
someone he would be 'babysitting' two years later." Id. This Court noted that while 
both victims were minors, they "had different ages (one was a young child, the other 
was almost an adult), the type of sexual contact was different (digital vaginal penetration 
and the rubbing of buttocks), and the incidents occurred two years apart," while the 
similarities, "that both girls were only temporarily in the household, that the acts 
occurred in Field's home, and that the abuse began with 'innocent' touching" were 
"insufficient to prove a common scheme or plan." Id. at 566-67. 
Interpreting the similar Federal Criminal Rule of Procedure 8,6 the Ninth Circuit 
has explained that its "common scheme or plan" language requires an examination of 
6 The key difference between Idaho's Rule 8 and the federal version is that the plain 
language of the federal rule is far more liberal, allowing for joinder when the offenses 
"are of the same or similar character" even if they are not based on the same act or 
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"whether '[c]omission of one of the offenses [ ]either depended upon [ ]or necessarily 
led to the commission of the other; proof of the one act [ ]either constituted [ ]or 
depended upon proof of the other."' United States v. Jawara, 474 F.3d 565, 574 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Halper, 590 F.2d 422, 429 (2d Cir. 1978)) (brackets 
in original). 
In State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664 (2010), interpreting the term "common 
scheme or plan" in assessing the admissibility of other acts evidence under Rule 404(b) 
in a lewd conduct prosecution, this Court provided guidance as to the meaning and 
scope of the term "common scheme or plan." Johnson was charged with three counts 
of lewd conduct, alleged to have been committed against his daughter when she was 
six to seven years old. Johnson, 148 Idaho at 666. The charges concerned allegations 
that Johnson had engaged the victim in manual-to-genital contact, oral-to-genital 
contact, and attempted sexual intercourse through genital-to-genital contact. Id. Over 
Johnson's objection, the State was allowed to introduce evidence that Johnson "had 
molested his younger sister when she was approximately eight years old and he was 
between fifteen and sixteen," with such abuse consisting mainly of "Johnson exposing 
himself to his sister and requesting that she expose herself to him," with one instance of 
manual-to-genital contact. Id. at 667. 
This Court first acknowledged its recent decision in Grist, noting, "It reiterated 
that bad acts may only be admitted 'if relevant to prove ... a common scheme or plan 
embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of 
one tends to establish the other, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
transaction or part of a common scheme or plan. Compare F.R.Cr.P. 8(a) with I.C.R. 
8(a). 
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accident."' Id. at 668 (quoting Grist, 147 Idaho at 54-55) (emphasis in original). 
Summarizing its holding, this Court explained, "In other words, at a minimum, there 
must be evidence of a common scheme or plan beyond the bare fact that sexual 
misconduct has occurred with children in the past." Id. 
In allowing the evidence to be presented, the district court had found three 
characteristics that provided a link between the prior acts and the pending charges: "(1) 
both victims were about seven to eight years old; (2) both victims viewed Johnson as an 
'authority figure' because he was an older brother or father; [and] (3) both courses of 
conduct involved Johnson requesting the victim to touch his penis." Id. at 669. In 
finding admission of the prior acts improper, this Court explained, "These similarities, 
however, are sadly far too unremarkable to demonstrate a 'common scheme or plan' in 
Johnson's behavior. The facts that the two victims in this case are juvenile females and 
that Johnson is a family member are precisely what make these incidents unfortunately 
quite ordinary." Id. 
In State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 304 P.3d 276 (2013), this Court summarized the 
rule it clarified in Grist and affirmed in Johnson as follows: 
[T]o be admissible under Rule 404(b ), evidence of prior misconduct must 
show more than a superficial similarity to the nature and details of the 
charged conduct, but must instead show that the defendant's charged and 
uncharged conduct is linked in a way that permits the inference that the 
prior conduct was planned as part of a course of conduct leading up to the 
charged offense. 
Joy, 155 Idaho at_, 304 P.3d at 285 (emphasis added). 
No evidence was offered that the alleged abuse of J.B. in 2004 "was planned as 
part of a course of conduct leading up to" the alleged abuse of K.B. in 2011 and 2012. 
It would be illogical to conclude that the alleged abuse in 2004 of a different victim of a 
different age in a different manner and with a different relationship to Mr. Bower was 
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perpetrated in order to commit the later alleged abuse in 2011 and 201 See Field, 
1 Idaho at 566 ("There is nothing to show that at the time Field committed the offense 
against T.B. he had a plan to also commit an offense against H.P .... [or] against 
someone he would be 'babysitting' two years later"). 
Assuming that it is appropriate to go beyond the interpretation of the "common 
scheme or plan" language from Rule 8 provided by this Court in Field, or the similar 
interpretation of "common scheme or plan" for purposes of Idaho Rule of Evidence 
404(b) provided by this Court in Joy, the factual differences and the number of years 
between the conduct alleged in count two and that alleged in counts one and three 
make it clear that joinder was legally improper. Aside from the large amount of time 
between the incident involving J.B. and K.B. (seven to eight years), the difference in 
relationships between Mr. Bower and the alleged victims (K.B. is Mr. Bower's daughter, 
while J.B. is the daughter of Mr. Bower's former long-term girlfriend), and the difference 
in the conduct alleged (one proceeded to full-blown intercourse, while the other involved 
manual-to-genital contact), Mr. Bower notes that the age differences between the two 
alleged victims, approximately three years, especially in light of the ages that they were, 
compels a finding that count two was improperly joined with counts one and three. 7 
Regardless of whether it is the factual differences themselves or the lack of any 
evidence that the conduct alleged to have been committed against J.B. in 2004 was part 
of a plan to commit the charged offenses against K.B. in 2011 and 2012, the denial of 
Mr. Bower's motion to sever was erroneous. Mr. Bower maintains that, in light of the 
nature of the charges and the testimony given by both alleged victims, it will be 
7 One of the victims in this case, J.B., was 10 or 11 years old, whereas the more recent 
victim, K.B., was 13 or 14 years old. (R., p.20.) In short, one victim was a teenager, 
while the other was not. 
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impossible for the State to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that no prejudice 
occurred as a result of the improper joinder.8 As such, the only appropriate remedy is 
for this Court to vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter for new, 
separate trials. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Bower respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter for separate trials. 
DATED this 1ih day of June, 2014. 
SPENCER J. HAHN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
8 The prejudice inherent in this type of case, with charges involving multiple victims 
improperly joined, is summed up by a review of the transcript of a portion of the 
examination of one member of the jury panel in voir dire: 
Q. And so in a case like this, you wouldn't give Kyle a presumption of 
innocence? 
A. There's two victims? 
Q. Well, that's what they say. 
A. I'd have a hard time, yeah ... 
A. I'd just have a hard time believing somebody when two people 
made the same accusation. 
(Tr., p.232, L.14 - p.233, L.9.) 
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